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InTroDucTIon 
“Not everything that is faced can be changed. But nothing 
can be changed until it is faced.”
—James Baldwin 
The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) has forced the phase-out of more than ninety-five percent of several classes of 
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer in developed countries 
and approximately fifty to seventy-five percent of these ozone 
depleting substances (“ODSs”) in developing countries.1 As a 
consequence of these phase-outs, a significant portion of ODSs 
that are used as refrigerants and foam-blowing agents are now 
being replaced with hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”). Although 
HFCs are not ODSs, they are extremely powerful greenhouse 
gases (“GHGs”) that exacerbate climate change. Most HFCs 
have a global-warming potential (“GWP”)2 hundreds to thou-
sands of times greater than carbon dioxide (“CO2”). The Mon-
treal Protocol must respond to climate impacts of HFCs by 
encouraging the use of other energy-efficient ODS substitutes 
with low GWP.
A second issue that the Montreal Protocol must address is 
that, although existing stockpiles of ODSs have been taken out of 
service, ODSs in discarded stockpiles, equipment, and products, 
collectively referred to as “Banks,”3 are rapidly emitting power-
ful GHGs into the atmosphere.4 The emissions from Banks are 
delaying the recovery of the ozone layer and exacerbating global 
climate change. Banks are currently not regulated by either the 
Montreal Protocol or the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). The 
Montreal Protocol must take responsibility for the Banks, cre-
ated by the use and effective phase-out of ODSs, before these 
GHGs are emitted to the atmosphere. The International Panel on 
Climate Change (“IPCC”) and the Technology and Economic 
Assessment Panel (“TEAP”) estimated in 2002 that approxi-
mately 21 gigatons (“Gt.”) of CO2 equivalent (“CO2-eq.”) are 
contained in Banks.5 Unless action is taken now, the IPCC/
TEAP Special Report predicts that total direct emissions of 
CO2-eq. are expected to reach 2.3 Gt. per year by 2015, nullifying 
all of the reductions in GHGs achieved under the Kyoto Protocol.6 
The history of the Montreal Protocol is one of a dynamic 
and evolving treaty that responds quickly to changes in ozone 
and climate science, technology, and the needs of industries and 
countries dependent on ODSs and their substitutes. Following 
the montreal protocol muSt act to  
prevent global climate change while  
reStoring the ozone layer
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in this tradition, and consistent with the purpose and spirit of 
the Montreal Protocol to protect the global environment, deci-
sions should be made to include high-GWP HFCs among the 
categories of regulated chemicals and to expand the Montreal 
Protocol’s mandate by covering the destruction of Banks. Criti-
cally-necessary actions to achieve these goals include:
 1. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to add high-GWP 
HFCs as controlled substances.
 2. A decision by the Montreal Protocol to discourage the pro-
duction and consumption of high-GWP HFCs and to finance 
the incremental costs that developing countries must incur 
to avoid using high-GWP HFCs.
 3. Expansion of the Montreal Protocol’s activities to include 
the management and destruction of Banks worldwide.
 4. Coordination with the UNFCCC to: (a) have the phase-out of 
high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effective technol-
ogy transfer and funding mechanisms that can be incorpo-
rated into post-Kyoto Protocol institutions for other GHGs; 
and (b) develop effective funding mechanisms for destroy-
ing Banks before they are released to the atmosphere.
The Montreal Protocol and its Parties have repeatedly recog-
nized the need to address the full environmental implications of 
their actions.7 Regulation of high-GWP HFCs, a class of chemi-
cals that was commercialized directly due to the phase-out of 
ODSs under the Montreal Protocol, and managing and destroying 
the Banks of ODSs are the next steps in fulfilling this mandate.
The monTreal proTocol
The Montreal Protocol has been widely touted as the most 
successful international environmental treaty to date, having 
phased out the production and consumption of the vast major-
ity of ODSs in accordance with set timeframes. The Montreal 
Protocol includes the innovative approach of having devel-
oped countries (“non-Article 5 countries”) phase out ODSs on 
a faster schedule than developing countries (“Article 5 coun-
tries”), thereby acknowledging both developed nations’ larger 
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contributions to historic emissions and developing nations’ 
need to provide for their own future economic and environmen-
tal development. Additionally, the Montreal Protocol includes 
proven mechanisms to assist Article 5 countries in meeting their 
ODS reduction goals by facilitating technology transfer and pro-
viding financial assistance to ensure compliance and the creation 
of necessary infrastructure. 
The most basic tenet of the Montreal Protocol is the Parties’ 
obligation to limit “consumption” and “production” of “controlled 
substances.”8 By definition, “controlled substances” include any 
substance listed in the annexes to the Montreal Protocol, regard-
less of whether it exists alone or within a mixture.9 To enable the 
Parties to meet their mandate to 
restore the ozone layer, the Mon-
treal Protocol can add a substance 
to the annexes of controlled sub-
stances when it is recognized as a 
significant ODS.10 Additionally, 
the Montreal Protocol permits 
Parties independently to regu-
late substances not included in 
the Protocol or undertake more 
stringent control measures than 
required under the Montreal 
Protocol.11
It is important to note that, 
while the Montreal Protocol sets 
specific timelines for the phase-
out of ODSs, it does not specify 
the manner in which the phase-
out goals are to be achieved. 
This flexibility allows Parties 
to meet the targets in a manner 
best suited to their individual 
situations.12 Parties are permit-
ted to utilize materials that have 
been stockpiled, produced, or used as a feedstock in the produc-
tion of other chemicals.13 Moreover, trade in recycled and used 
chemicals is not included in the calculation of consumption to 
encourage the recycling of materials as a means of satisfying 
consumption needs while facilitating phase-out of production.14 
Article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, entitled Special Section 
of Developing Countries, was negotiated to establish a grace 
period for compliance with the control provisions to phase out 
consumption and production of ODSs ranging between ten and 
fifteen years, depending on the chemical, beyond the deadlines 
for developed countries.15 Only those nations with an annual 
per capita consumption of ODSs of less than 0.3 kilograms per 
year can take advantage of the more lenient extended phase-out 
schedule.16 Article 5 charges developed nations with the respon-
sibility to provide financial and technological assistance to the 
developing nations in the implementation of technologies and 
processes with less ozone depleting effects.17 
Under Article 10A of the Montreal Protocol, non-Article 5 
countries are required to transfer “best available, environmentally 
safe substitutes and related technologies” to Article 5 nations at 
“fair and most favorable trade conditions.”18 This commitment 
to facilitate the access of developing countries to relevant scien-
tific information, data, training, and technology was reasserted 
in the Helsinki Declaration adopted at the First Meeting of the 
Parties in 1989.19 
financial mechaniSm/multilateral funD 
To address the hesitancy among developing nations to ratify 
the Montreal Protocol due to concerns over resources required 
for compliance and impacts on their development,20 mecha-
nisms were incorporated into the Montreal Protocol to provide 
the financial resources necessary for developing nations to meet 
their shared obligations. The 
dominant feature of the financial 
mechanisms is the Multilateral 
Fund for the Implementation of 
the Montreal Protocol (“Mul-
tilateral Fund”),21 designed to 
cover incremental costs incurred 
by developing countries as a 
result of the phase-out of their 
consumption and production of 
ODSs.22 
Every three years, the Par-
ties to the Montreal Protocol 
determine the budget for the 
Multilateral Fund for a three-
year “triennium,” with contribu-
tions from over forty developed 
nations based on a United 
Nations assessment scale.23 The 
Multilateral Fund is managed by 
an Executive Committee com-
prised of seven industrialized 
nations and seven developing 
countries, which reports annually to the Meeting of the Parties.24 
At the 56th Meeting of the Executive Committee in Doha, Qatar 
in November 2008, the Executive Committee approved 116 proj-
ects and activities for sixty-five countries totaling $57,347,247 
plus $9,956,600 support costs for bilateral and implementing 
agencies.25 
The Multilateral Fund has helped industry in develop-
ing countries replace chemicals and equipment and reorganize 
production processes, effectively stimulating the redesign of 
products.26 The Multilateral Fund has played a pivotal role in 
facilitating the transfer of technology and enhancing capacity 
building and development capabilities, thereby contributing to 
the overall success of the Montreal Protocol.
recognITIon oF The InTerplay beTween  
oDss anD clImaTe change
The Montreal Protocol has already significantly benefited 
international climate change mitigation. It is estimated that the 
phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and other ODSs will 
The Montreal Protocol’s 
continued condoning of 
the use of high-GWP 
HFCs conflicts with its 
precautionary and holistic 
approach to phasing 
out ODSs by creating 
altogether different, but no 
less dire, environmental 
consequences.
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have reduced GHG emissions by 135 Gt. of CO2-eq. between 
1990 and 2010.27 Both the text of the Montreal Protocol and sub-
sequent decisions by the Parties make clear that the phase-out 
of ODSs should not occur in a vacuum; rather, relevant scien-
tific information and environmental impacts, including climatic 
effects, should be considered. The Parties supported this concept 
by adopting Decision V/8 in 1993,28 requiring Parties to con-
sider ODS substitutes in light of their environmental impacts. 
The following year, the Parties further expanded their mandate 
to consider environmental impacts other than ozone depletion 
by adopting Decision VI/13.29 
That requires the TEAP to “con-
sider how available alternatives 
compare with hydrochloro-
fluorocarbons (“HCFCs”), with 
respect to such factors as energy 
efficiency, total global warming 
impact, potential flammability, 
and toxicity.”30
The interplay between the 
phase-out of ODSs and climate 
change was again explicitly 
recognized at the Tenth Meet-
ing of the Parties in 1998 when 
forty Parties issued a statement 
making it clear that climate 
impacts should be considered in 
the work of the Montreal Proto-
col. The Parties stated that there 
are “scientific indications that 
global warming could delay the 
recovery of the ozone layer” and 
“environmentally sound alternative substances and technologies 
are available for virtually all HCFC applications.”31 The Parties 
urged:
all Parties of the Montreal Protocol to consider all ODS 
replacement technologies, taking into account their 
total global-warming potential, so that use of alterna-
tives with a high contribution to global warming should 
be discouraged where other, more environmentally 
friendly, safe and technically and economically feasible 
alternatives or technologies are available.32 
The Montreal Protocol’s contribution to climate change and 
the high GWP of many ODSs and their substitutes are widely 
recognized.33 As a result, in 2007, the Parties decided to accel-
erate substantially the phase-out of HCFCs, primarily due their 
emissions contribution to global climate change.34 It is esti-
mated that the more rapid phase-out of HCFCs will result in the 
following:
	 •	 A	reduction	of	potential	emissions	of	HCFCs	by	approxi-
mately forty-seven percent from what would have been 
emitted if the accelerated phase-out had not been adopted, 
avoiding the emission of nearly one million tons of ODSs; and
	 •	 A	 transition	 to	 low-GWP	substitutes	 for	HCFCs	 that	 are	
currently commercially available and under development, 
avoiding between 3 and 16 Gt. of CO2-eq. emissions into 
the atmosphere.35
The role of the Montreal Protocol in controlling GHGs was 
explicitly affirmed in the 2007 G8 Summit Declaration, which 
pledged: “We will also endeavor under the Montreal Protocol 
to ensure the recovery of the ozone layer by accelerating the 
phase-out of HCFCs in a way that supports energy efficiency 
and climate change objectives.”36 Following the historic agree-
ment to accelerate the phase-out of HCFCs, the Leaders Meeting 
of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change 
reaffirmed their commitment to 
helping the climate by declaring 
on July 9, 2008: “[R]ecognizing 
the need for urgent action . . . 
we commit to . . . actions under 
the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer for the benefit of the 
global climate system.”37 The 
explicit focus on climate ben-
efits and energy efficiency, in 
addition to ozone benefits, when 
assessing the overall impacts 
of ODS substitutes and other 
strategies adopted by the Mon-
treal Protocol, is consistent with 
the Montreal Protocol’s history 
of basing actions on sound sci-
ence and objective technical 
assessments.
At the Twentieth Meet-
ing of the Parties in November 
2008, the impact on the global climate of ODS substitutes was 
recognized in Decisions XX/7 and XX/8, which began the pro-
cess of evaluating the management and destruction of Banks 
and the availability and feasibility of low-GWP alternatives to 
ODSs.38 
preempTIve acTIon encouragIng The use oF 
low-gwp alTernaTIves To oDss wIll have 
sIgnIFIcanT clImaTe beneFITs
The timing is right for the Parties to control the use of high-
GWP HFCs as ODS substitutes, even if these substitutes are 
not ODSs themselves, as the commercialization of high-GWP 
HFCs is the direct result of the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of 
ODSs. The UN Conference on Environment and Development 
calls on the Parties to “[r]eplace CFCs and other ozone depleting 
substances, consistent with the Montreal Protocol, recognizing 
that a replacement’s suitability should be evaluated holistically 
and not simply on its contribution to solving one atmospheric 
or environmental problem.”39 The Montreal Protocol’s contin-
ued condoning of the use of high-GWP HFCs conflicts with its 
precautionary and holistic approach to phasing out ODSs by cre-
ating altogether different, but no less dire, environmental con-
sequences. This is particularly true where substitutes for ODSs 
The regulation and  
phase-out of high-GWP 
HFCs under the Montreal 
Protocol would ensure 
a more comprehensive 
approach by all significant 
producers and users  
of HFCs on an  
equitable basis.
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with low-GWP, including carbon dioxide (GWP = 1), hydrocar-
bon and hydrocarbon blends (GWP < 3), and HFC-152a (GWP 
= 140) are all technically- and economically-feasible replace-
ments for high-GWP HFCs currently used in both automotive 
and stationary air conditioning and refrigeration units.40
The Montreal Protocol has historically regulated refriger-
ants, foam-blowing agents, aerosols, firefighting chemicals, 
specialty medical chemicals, and a limited number of other 
chemicals that deplete the ozone layer. As a result, the Parties 
have acquired an in-depth understanding of these industries and 
the uses of ODSs. HFCs are now being used as replacements for 
ODSs in the same sectors41 or are being created as by-products 
of the production of these ODSs.42 Therefore, regulating HFCs 
would be a logical extension of the Montreal Protocol’s mandate 
and consistent with its holistic approach to sectors interacting 
with and affected by the phase-out of ODSs.
Decision XX/8, adopted in November 2008, requested that 
the TEAP report on the status of alternatives to HCFCs and 
HFCs include a description of the various use patterns, costs, 
and potential market penetration of alternatives.43 The results of 
the TEAP’s investigation are going to be presented at a work-
shop before the next Open-Ended Working Group Meeting in 
Geneva, Switzerland in July 2009.44 The meeting will address 
technical and policy issues related to ODS alternatives, with a 
particular focus on how the Montreal Protocol can address the 
impact of high-GWP HFCs while maximizing the ozone and cli-
mate benefits of the early phase-out of HCFCs.45 The UNFCCC 
has been invited to participate, as HFCs are within the “basket” 
of GHGs being controlled by the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Pro-
tocol. It is anticipated that the results of the investigation and 
workshop will lead to concrete measures to encourage the use of 
low-GWP substitutes for ODSs. 
Unless the use of high-GWP HFCs is promptly curtailed 
globally, their rapid emergence as the primary substitutes for 
HCFCs and other ODSs could significantly negate the cli-
mate mitigation benefits achieved by the historic phasing-out 
of ODSs, offsetting reductions of other GHG emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Absent coordinated global action under the 
Montreal Protocol in consultation with the UNFCCC, emissions 
of ODS substitutes will exacerbate the global climate crisis. The 
Montreal Protocol has the technical and funding mechanisms 
in place to implement control measures in order to address the 
prompt phase-out of high-GWP HFCs and demonstrate how 
classes of GHGs within specific sectors can be effectively con-
trolled and eliminated. However, having the phase-out of HFCs 
occur under the Montreal Protocol will require substantial inter-
national support. The control of HFCs by the Montreal Protocol 
would be a model for a UNFCCC sectorial approach to control 
of GHGs after 2012. The Parties must act with urgency once 
again to strengthen and expand the scope of the Montreal Proto-
col by amending it to control high-GWP HFCs before their use 
and production are widespread and the cost to transition to low-
GWP substitutes increases exponentially and becomes poten-
tially prohibitive.
emIssIons From banks pose an ImmeDIaTe 
clImaTe ThreaT
Emissions from Banks threaten to delay the recovery of the 
ozone layer and dramatically impede global efforts to combat 
climate change. While the use and production of many ODSs 
have been drastically reduced over the past two decades, ODS 
Banks still remain in products and machinery throughout the 
world. ODSs in Banks are continuously being released to the 
atmosphere, either through leakage or when ODSs or prod-
ucts containing them are disposed of at the end of their useful 
lives.46 However, the Montreal Protocol defines “consumption” 
as imports plus production minus export, thus excluding the 
regulation of ODSs in Banks from the Montreal Protocol.47 This 
does not include the atmospheric release of ODSs from Banks 
and as a result ODSs have not been regulated by the Montreal 
Protocol to date. Nonetheless, potential solutions exist to rem-
edy this problem. 
bankS can be effectively maintaineD anD 
DeStroyeD 
The mandate for the Montreal Protocol must be immediately 
expanded to implement a comprehensive program to address the 
maintenance and destruction of Banks. The TEAP has estimated 
that the potential cumulative savings if ODSs were recovered 
and destroyed across all sectors would be approximately six 
billion tons of CO2-eq. between 2011 and 2050, noting that a 
sizeable portion of those ODSs would require significant collec-
tion efforts.48  To put this into perspective, this large a release 
of GHGs would offset all of the gains accomplished under the 
Kyoto Protocol.49 If the world’s Banks of ODSs in refrigeration, 
stationary air conditioning, and mobile air conditioning (i.e., 
those that are most easily and cost-effectively recovered) were 
destroyed, it is estimated that the release of approximately 2.8 
Gt. of CO2-eq. would be prevented by 2015.
50 As these emis-
sions are already occurring continuously throughout the world, 
the gains that could be achieved by preventing these “super” 
GHGs from being emitted to the atmosphere are available 
immediately. 
Approximately forty percent of Banks are installed in the 
refrigeration and stationary and mobile air conditioning sectors, 
while the remaining sixty percent are in foams, medical aero-
sols, fire protection, and other sectors.51 Furthermore, Banks are 
continuing to increase as the complete phase-out date for ODSs 
approach52 and the phase-out of HCFCs is being expedited. 
Therefore, Banks will become an increasing problem in the near 
future.
The Montreal Protocol and the Parties to it have recognized 
the risk to both the ozone layer and global climate from emis-
sions from Banks. As a result, the scope of the problem and the 
destruction options and their associated costs have been evalu-
ated for many years.53  
In November 2008, at the Twentieth Meeting of the Parties, 
the Parties took the first concrete steps to manage and destroy 
Banks. In Decision XX/7,54 the Parties agreed to a broad range 
of actions to evaluate the management and destruction of Banks, 
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including: (1) evaluating ways to mitigate emissions of ODS 
from Banks through the Montreal Protocol or by national and/
or regional legislative strategies; (2) authorizing pilot projects to 
evaluate collection, transport, storage, and destruction of ODSs 
to generate data on how these measures will protect the ozone 
layer and achieve climate benefits; and (3) evaluating and adopt-
ing best practices and performance standards to prevent emis-
sions from Banks, whether by recovery, recycling, reclamation, 
reuse as feedstock, or destruction.55 The Parties also commis-
sioned the TEAP to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of destroying 
banks of ODSs versus recycling, reclaiming, and reusing such 
substances, taking into consideration the relative economic costs 
and environmental benefits to the ozone layer and climate.56 
Additionally, recognizing that financial constraints limiting the 
ability to manage and destroy Banks are going to be the decisive 
factor as to whether emissions from Banks can be effectively 
destroyed, the Parties scheduled a meeting of experts from fund-
ing institutions, such as the UNFCCC, the Global Environment 
Facility, the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mecha-
nism, and the World Bank, to assess possible funding oppor-
tunities before the next meeting of the Open-Ended Working 
Group.57
Twelve technologies have been approved to date under the 
Montreal Protocol for the destruction of CFCs and halons.58 In 
developed countries, different technologies are in use for CFC 
destruction on a commercial basis. For instance, in Japan, more 
than ten technologies were being used in approximately eighty-
two ODS destruction plants in operation as of 2006.59 Commer-
cial ODS destruction facilities using technologies approved by 
the TEAP are in operation in twenty countries worldwide.60 ICF 
estimates that ODS destruction capacities range roughly from 
forty to six hundred metric tons per year.61 The cost to destroy 
ODS at these facilities varies by country, technology, capacity, 
and ODS type. Overall, it was estimated that ODS destruction 
costs range between two and thirteen dollars per kilogram, with 
an average of about seven dollars per kilogram.62 The pilot stud-
ies approved by the Montreal Protocol and a similar study being 
undertaken by the World Bank63 are intended to determine what 
technologies work best for which ODSs, to identify ODSs that 
are actually recoverable, to devise a plan to address ODSs in 
Article 5 countries, to ascertain the recovery costs for different 
ODSs, and to suggest methodologies for validation and verifi-
cation of the destruction of ODSs. These findings can then be 
incorporated into international carbon off-set regimes.
Tackling the destruction of Banks will require a multi-fac-
eted approach. In non-Article 5 countries, feasible regulatory 
approaches include requiring producer/retailers to collect and 
destroy ODSs, providing incentives for ODS destruction, and 
creating industry-lead programs for this purpose.64 Most non-
Article 5 countries have available infrastructure and facilities 
to destroy ODSs effectively in a validated and verifiable man-
ner.65 In Article 5 countries, however, there will be a need for 
financial and technology transfers to store and maintain existing 
Banks, create destruction facilities, and transport ODSs to exist-
ing facilities for destruction, all activities consistent with those 
traditionally occurring through the Multilateral Fund. Infrastruc-
ture building and personnel training in these countries will also 
be necessary so that the ODS destruction can be validated and 
verified.
funDing the DeStruction of bankS
To encourage and finance the destruction of Banks in the 
short available time frame, funding the Multilateral Fund at tra-
ditional levels will not be adequate. One way to generate addi-
tional funding would be to tap into the funding from Global 
Environment Facility (“GEF”)66 and the carbon trading systems 
(e.g., the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), Chicago 
Climate Exchange (“CCX”), and Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (“RGGI”)). As of September 2008, the CCX is the 
only carbon-trading platform that has an established protocol 
for generating credits for the destruction of ODSs.67 The CCX 
has developed a protocol to measure and verify GHG emission 
reductions resulting from the destruction of ODSs.68 
Currently, the destruction of ODSs has not been approved as 
an acceptable offset project under the CDM and therefore cannot 
generate Certified Emissions Reductions (“CERs”) under the 
Kyoto Protocol. Under current CDM rules, however, an inter-
national body such as the Montreal Protocol can apply to gener-
ate CERs by coordinating a Program of Activities comprised of 
numerous CDM programs. By applying and taking control of 
ODS destruction programs, the Montreal Protocol could issue 
CERs and generate significant funds for the Multilateral Fund 
to distribute to Article 5 countries to ensure the expeditious and 
controlled destruction of Banks. If the Montreal Protocol takes 
on the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs, this could generate rev-
enues not only to fund the phase-out and destruction of Banks 
but also of HFCs as well.69
Obtaining funding from the various carbon trading platforms 
would result in substantial revenues that could be used to facili-
tate widespread and rapid Banks destruction. However, allowing 
the destruction of ODS Banks into the carbon trading system has 
to be structured carefully to maintain the stability of the markets, 
ensure that the ODSs destruction results in real climate impact, 
and prevent the increased production of ODSs or high-GWP 
substitutes simply to profit from the carbon market. Due to the 
extremely high GWP of many ODSs, the destruction of small 
volumes of ODSs can result in the potential issuance of very 
large numbers of CERs. For example, the most common CFCs 
in reachable refrigeration and air-conditioning are CFC-11 and 
CFC-12 which have GWPs of 5000 and 8500, respectively.70 
Therefore, destruction of one ton of these substances would 
result in the generation of thousands of CERs.  It was estimated 
that there were 218,318 tons of CFCs in refrigeration and air 
conditioning banks in 2002.71  Destruction of a fraction of these 
CFC banks and the resultant issuance of CERs could signifi-
cantly destabilize the carbon markets and divert funding from 
other projects that reduce the emissions of other GHGs or to pre-
vent deforestation. These problems could be avoided by having 
the CERs issued for ODS destruction controlled by the Mon-
treal Protocol and having the number of CERs issued correspond 
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to the actual cost of destroying the Banks. By tying the CERs 
issued to the actual cost of destruction, the Multilateral Fund 
would have the sales proceeds from the CERs to promote quick 
and comprehensive Banks destruction. This would not create a 
disproportionate number of CERs or destabilize the carbon mar-
kets; rather, it would ensure that the CERs issued were directly 
tied to the climate benefit achieved.
Destruction of only banned ODS Banks should initially be 
eligible for CERs in order to prevent the creation of a perverse 
incentive to produce more ODSs with high GWP simply for the 
value of the CERs. This prob-
lem has already been identified 
arising from the production of 
HCFC-22 (GWP = 178072), 
used widely in window unit air 
conditioners and small refrig-
erators, which produce HFC-23 
(GWP = 14,31073) as a byprod-
uct. CERs can be earned for the 
destruction of HCF-23 through 
the CDM. However, as the cost 
of destroying HFC-23 is very 
low, approximately $0.20 per 
ton of CO2-eq.,
74 and the price 
of CERs is typically between 
$5 and $15 per metric ton of 
CO2 -eq. reduction,
75 huge prof-
its could be made from HFC-23 
destruction. It has been calcu-
lated that the cost of the direct 
installation of equipment to 
destroy HFC-23 would only be 
$100 million compared to $6 
billion worth of CERs that have 
been issued.76 The CERs for the 
destruction of HFC-23 are suf-
ficiently profitable that industry 
observers have suggested that new HCFC-22 production facili-
ties can be financed on the expected profits from the CERs from 
the HFC-23 destruction alone.77 
Bank destruction can be incorporated into the carbon mar-
kets without creating such perverse incentives by limiting the 
issuance of CERs to ODSs that are banned. It will be important 
to also ensure that funding is available to investigate and prevent 
illegal production of banned ODSs given the sizeable profits that 
can be made if CERs are given for their destruction.
coorDInaTIon oF regulaTIon oF hFcs unDer 
The monTreal proTocol wITh The unFccc
HFCs are in the “basket” of gases regulated by the UNFC-
CC’s Kyoto Protocol.78 The current regulation of HFC emissions 
under the UNFCCC should not impede complementary regula-
tion under the Montreal Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol requires 
industrialized countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol to 
cut their GHG emissions by an average of 5.2% from the 1990 
level by the year 2012.79 The Kyoto Protocol has currently been 
ratified by 118 countries, including 32 industrialized countries, 
collectively representing only 44.2% of 1990 emissions.80 Con-
versely, all the major ODS and HFC-producing and consuming 
countries have ratified the Montreal Protocol, which has the 
ability to impose phase-out requirements on all of these Parties. 
Therefore, at this stage, the regulation and phase-out of high-
GWP HFCs under the Montreal Protocol would ensure a more 
comprehensive approach by all significant producers and users 
of HFCs on an equitable basis, thereby substantially reducing 
the likelihood of illegal trade in 
HFCs by creating an even eco-
nomic playing field as a result of 
the global regulation of HFCs.
In international law, suc-
cessive treaties on the same sub-
ject matter are commonplace, as 
recognized by the Vienna Con-
vention.81 International law prin-
ciples allow a treaty that covers 
the subject matter of an historic 
treaty to be entered into force, 
subject to established rules of 
interpretation.82 To the extent 
the successive treaties are com-
patible, the provisions of both 
treaties are enforceable. When 
they are incompatible and where 
the subject matter and parties 
to the treaties are the same, the 
language of the later treaty or the 
more specific treaty generally 
controls.83 
The Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol have the expertise to 
regulate high-GWP HFCs by 
controlling and phasing out their 
production and consumption. This is compatible with and com-
plementary to the UNFCCC’s regulation of emissions of HFCs. 
The technical expertise, mechanism for technology transfer, 
and Multilateral Fund to assist developing countries make the 
Montreal Protocol uniquely suited to control and phase out high-
GWP HFCs. The Montreal Protocol HFC phase-out would act 
as a mechanism for developed countries in UNFCCC to achieve 
deep emissions cuts and act as a technology transfer mechanism 
to help developing countries reduce their GHG emissions in a 
measurable, reportable, and verifiable manner. As the UNFCCC 
negotiates to extend efforts to control GHGs past 2012, it can 
work in collaboration with the Montreal Protocol to use an HFC 
phase-out as a tool for Parties to meet strong emissions reduc-
tion targets and to ensure that high-GWP HFCs are not need-
lessly substituted for ODSs in developing countries.
The UNFCCC’s Bali Action Plan84 makes it clear that the 
post-2012 climate framework will emphasize technology trans-
fer for developing countries and sectorial emissions reduction 
A successful collaborative 
effort between the 
UNFCCC and Montreal 
Protocols could alleviate 
some of the tensions 
in the current climate 
negotiations. The 
Montreal Protocol has 
demonstrated effective 
technology transfer and 
funding mechanisms for 
developing countries.
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approaches. Recent submissions by developing countries con-
cerning mechanisms for technology transfers have included 
the creation of technology assessment panels and encouraged 
capacity building to enable these countries to address GHGs 
effectively. These techniques have already been deployed by the 
Montreal Protocol; therefore, a phase-out of high-GWP HFCs 
under the Montreal Protocol would serve as a model to demon-
strate that these techniques can be usefully applied to control 
other GHGs.
A successful collaborative 
effort between the UNFCCC 
and Montreal Protocols could 
alleviate some of the tensions in 
the current climate negotiations. 
The Montreal Protocol has dem-
onstrated effective technology 
transfer and funding mecha-
nisms for developing countries. 
If applied to HFCs under the 
post-Kyoto Protocol regime, 
this could build trust between 
developed and developing coun-
tries within UNFCCC negotia-
tions and instill confidence that 
reductions in all GHGs would 
occur in an equitable manner, without disproportionately disad-
vantaging the economies of the developing countries.
acTIons neeDeD To aDDress hIgh-gwp  
hFcs anD banks
Decision to Add HFCs as a Class of Chemicals Regulated 
and Phased-Out Under the Montreal Protocol, Including a Pledge 
Not to Use High-GWP HFCs Where More Environmentally Suit-
able Alternative Substances or Technologies Are Available
To date, the Montreal Protocol has only regulated sub-
stances that directly deplete the ozone layer. However, the lan-
guage of the Montreal Protocol does not so limit its authority, 
and the Parties should amend the Montreal Protocol to expand 
its mission to include combating climate change associated with 
ODSs and their substitutes.85 Simple amendments would allow 
the Parties to ensure that the phase-out of ODSs is accomplished 
without exacerbating climate change.86 The need for the Mon-
treal Protocol to continue its work to find low-GWP substitutes 
for ODSs is particularly apparent with the projected massive 
increase in the use of high-GWP HFCs as the result of the phase-
out of the ODSs. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol will 
not be achieved until ODSs have been replaced by substances 
with minimal adverse impacts to the global environment.  
An amendment of the Montreal Protocol specifically to 
combat climate change caused by high-GWP HFCs, even though 
they are not ODSs, is consistent with international law princi-
ples for treaty interpretation. The first place to look for the intent 
and scope of a treaty is the text itself, including the Preamble.87 
When the Montreal Protocol was adopted, the Parties included 
in the Preamble both the concept that they were “[c]onscious 
of the potential climatic effects of” ODSs and that they were 
“[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by taking precautionary 
measures to control equitably total emissions of [ODSs] . . . on 
the basis of developments in scientific knowledge.”88 The text 
has to be interpreted in the context of all of the decisions made 
and actions taken by the Parties under the Montreal Protocol.89 
These actions include all of the decisions cited above,90 where 
the climatic effects of ODSs have been recognized and where 
the reduction and phase-out of 
ODSs have been required to be 
viewed in the context of broader 
environmental consequences, 
including the environmental 
impacts of ODS substitutes, and 
the latest scientific and tech-
nological knowledge. These 
actions also include all of the 
work performed to evaluate the 
non-ozone implications of the 
phase-out of ODSs.91
Expand the Montreal Pro-
tocol’s Mandate to Control 
Management and Destruction 
of Banks
Developing countries want 
predictable and sustained financing if they are going to be obli-
gated to maintain and destroy Banks. The Montreal Protocol ties 
financial assistance to specific goals and projects.92 The Mon-
treal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund is one of the mechanisms that 
has created good relations between developed and developing 
countries as they have worked to phase out ODSs. By keeping 
HFCs within the “basket” of GHGs regulated by the UNFCCC, 
funding for the phase-out of high-GWP HFCs under the Mon-
treal Protocol could become available through the funding 
mechanisms created by or in conjunction with the UNFCCC to 
defray some or all of the costs of the phase-out. Financing from 
the funding mechanisms currently being negotiated within the 
UNFCCC climate talks, as well as approving the destruction of 
ODSs to generate CERs, could create substantial new sources 
of funding for the Montreal Protocol to take on this important 
work. A phase-out of high-GWP HFCs would again act as a 
model to demonstrate the efficacy of certain aspects of its finan-
cial mechanisms. 
conclusIon
Some of the recent reductions in ODS use have been 
achieved by unnecessarily replacing ODSs with high-GWP 
HFCs. It is now well-established that high-GWP HFCs are add-
ing to the global climate crisis. Likewise, to date, the Montreal 
Protocol has focused on regulation of production and consump-
tion of ODSs and has not regulated the management or destruc-
tion of Banks. The objectives of the Montreal Protocol obligate 
the Parties to complete the task of restoring the ozone layer 
without exacerbating the global climate crisis. The Parties can 
accomplish this by: (1) committing not to use high-GWP HFCs 
The objectives of the 
Montreal Protocol obligate 
the Parties to complete the 
task of restoring the ozone 
layer without exacerbating 
the global climate crisis.  
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as substitutes for ODSs if other more environmentally-suitable 
alternative substances or technologies are available; (2) amend-
ing the Montreal Protocol to make clear that the protection of the 
ozone layer is not going to be accomplished through measures 
that exacerbate the global climate crisis by (a) actively phasing 
out the production and consumption of high-GWP substitutes 
and providing financial incentives for the use of low-GWP sub-
stitutes for ODSs, and (b) expanding the mandate of the Mon-
treal Protocol to include the management and destruction of 
Banks; and (3) coordinating with the UNFCCC to (a) have the 
phase-out of high-GWP HFCs serve as a case study for effec-
tive technology transfer and funding mechanisms that can be 
incorporated into post-Kyoto institutions for other GHGs and (b) 
develop effective funding mechanisms for Banks management 
and destruction.
The climate crisis can be effectively combated if it is dis-
aggregated into smaller, manageable components where the 
strengths of international, regional, and national organizations 
and entities can be brought to bear. The Montreal Protocol has 
the unique capacity to regulate and promote the phase-out of 
high-GWP HFCs used as ODS substitutes and to manage and 
destroy Banks. Both the transition to the use of high-GWP HFCs 
and the emissions from Banks are occurring as of the writing of 
this article, and the opportunity to control both of these serious 
threats to the global environment is time limited. The Montreal 
Protocol must be amended promptly to meet these urgent global 
challenges.
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